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Saving the Polar Bear, Saving the World: 
Can the Capabilities Approach do Justice to Humans, Animals and Ecosystems? 
 
In political theory, if not in practice, the protective sphere of justice is rapidly 
expanding. Abandoning the Rawlsian prerequisite of co-citizenship, cosmopolitans have 
defended the claims of those humans with whom we share a world but not a country. 
Some theorists have pushed the boundaries further still, among them Martha Nussbaum 
(2006) who has expanded her version of the capabilities approach not only to demand 
justice for those outside our borders but also to account for the claims of those within 
them who are not ‘fully cooperating members of society’ (Rawls 1993, p. 3). These 
include sentient nonhuman animals. David Schlosberg (2007) has gone beyond even 
this. He argues that the capabilities approach can be broadened to include the claims of 
justice not only of individual animals, but also of entire species and ecosystems.  
This is an attractive prospect: a happy marriage of social, environmental and 
ecological justice, which also respects the claims to flourishing of individual nonhuman 
animals. But is it also too good to be true? Can the capabilities approach really deliver? 
I would like to think it can, but there are serious obstacles to the project as it stands. The 
purpose of this paper is to highlight these difficulties and tentatively to consider how the 
capabilities approach might move beyond them.  
I will begin by briefly introducing the capabilities approach and Nussbaum’s and 
Schlosberg’s expanded models. I will not attempt to defend the approach in general. 
Nor will I defend their projects against claims that justice should not be extended 
beyond the human at all. These questions have both been debated in detail elsewhere.1 
Nor, finally, will I explicitly consider or reject rival theories (such as utilitarianism) as 
more appropriate models of justice to nonhumans.2 Instead, I will highlight four main 
obstacles to an expanded capabilities model. Three concern the potential for conflicting 
claims: of humans and the nonhuman world, of individual nonhuman animals, and of 
individual nonhuman animals and species or ecosystems. The fourth casts doubt on the 
whole project of doing justice to ecosystems. I will argue that the capabilities approach, 
                                                 
1 On the capabilities approach, see for example: Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1992 and 1999. On justice to 
nonhuman animals, see for example: Nussbaum 2006, pp. 326-66; Regan 1983; Singer 1974. On 
ecological justice, see for example: Baxter 2005; Schlosberg 2007, pp. 129-60. 
2 For a discussion of this point, see Nussbaum 2006, pp. 326-46 
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as expanded by Nussbaum and again by Schlosberg, can overcome the first of these by 
biting a fairly controversial bullet, but that the rest remain intractable.  
Indeed, I will argue that this problematic result is in fact unsurprising once it is 
pointed out that the nonhuman world, understood as including individual animals as 
well as species and ecosystems, lies outside the circumstances of justice as standardly 
applied to human society. Finally, I will speculate briefly on how the approach might 
move beyond this impasse. 
 
Capabilities and flourishing  
On the capabilities model, if we want to know how well individual human lives are 
going we should ask whether those individuals have a genuine opportunity (capability) 
to function in certain key human ways. These capabilities are then taken to be the 
appropriate metric for distributional justice. Nussbaum (2000, pp.78-80), on whose 
version this paper will focus, offers the following provisional list of central 
functionings, each of which we are supposed to be owed at least some threshold level of 
capability to achieve: Life; Bodily health; Bodily integrity; Senses, imagination and 
thought; Emotions; Practical reason; Affiliation; Other species; Play; and Control over 
one’s environment, both (a) Political and (b) Material. 
Nussbaum (2000, p. 5) is explicitly Rawlsian in that she presents the capabilities 
as ‘the object of an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very 
different comprehensive conceptions of the good’.3 However, unlike Rawls, Nussbaum 
(2006) defends the expansion of the sphere of distributive justice beyond state borders. 
Accusing the contractualists of conflating rule-makers with those for whom those rules 
are made, she also defends the expansion of capabilities-based justice to those humans 
who can never be fully cooperating members of a contractualist society. Finally, she 
expands it to include sentient nonhuman animals. 
 
                                                 
3 See Rawls 1993 for an extensive discussion of overlapping consensus.  
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Protecting the tender gazelle: Justice to individual animals 
It is easy to see this as a natural next step. If anything is uncontroversial, it is that the 
flourishing of an individual human life has moral value. But once flourishing is seen to 
involve more than the exercise of human rationality, we have a philosophical basis for 
what seems already obvious: nonhuman animals, like us, can flourish or not flourish. 
Their lives can go well or badly. If we have entitlements to be treated in certain ways, 
based on our capability to function in corresponding central ways, then it is at least 
plausible that nonhuman animals, who share many of those capabilities, have 
entitlements of their own. Nussbaum (2006, pp. 325-352) defends this position by 
appeal to areas of commonality and interaction between humans and nonhuman 
animals, as well as to the latter’s capacity for a dignified existence. She also defends the 
capabilities approach as better placed to accommodate our duties to nonhuman animals 
than existing utilitarian accounts or the Rawlsian contractualist view, which assigns 
only duties of ‘compassion and humanity’ (Rawls 1971, p. 448). 
On Nussbaum’s expanded model, individual sentient nonhuman animals, like 
individual humans, are the focus of our legitimate (moral and political) concern. But the 
sphere of justice ends there. That is not to say that species, or at least subgroups within 
species, do not play an important role in facilitating individual flourishing: ‘for animals, 
as for humans, the existence of suitable groups and communities is an important part of 
the flourishing of individuals’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 357).4 However, the flourishing of a 
species is not, in itself, a matter of justice. Extinction of a species is an injustice only 
because (and only if) that species is becoming extinct through the killing of its 
individual members and the destruction of their habitats. Moreover, although Nussbaum 
(2006, pp. 361-2) denies that the capacity to feel pleasure and pain is the only morally 
                                                 
4 Indeed, in emphasising affiliation and defining flourishing ‘around species norms’, Nussbaum (2006, p. 
363) is able to accommodate the relational component of human (and animal) interests highlighted by 




and politically relevant nonhuman animal capacity, she follows Singer in setting 
sentience as the threshold for considerations of justice.5 
As with humans, she argues that justice for nonhumans requires the securing of 
some threshold level of capabilities for all. Nussbaum (2006, pp. 393-401) draws up a 
tentative list, based on her list of ten central human capabilities, which cannot be traded 
off against one another. In the process, she outlines some practical implications. The 
killing of sentient nonhuman animals for sport or luxury items is ruled out, as are ‘all 
cruel practices and painful killings in the process of raising animals for food’. (She 
doesn’t advocate abandoning meat eating altogether.) Similarly, nonhuman animals 
under human control should not be deprived of a healthy life or bodily integrity. They 
are entitled to free movement and access to sources of pleasure, to form attachments to 
one another, to the opportunity for a variety of activities, to play, to be respected by the 
political framework in which they exist, and to have their habitats protected. 
Clearly, this would necessitate huge changes in human behaviour. But 
Nussbaum (2006, pp. 366-80) goes further, suggesting that not only human-animal but 
also animal-animal interaction might appropriately be governed by justice. Nature, she 
points out, is cruel. Nonhuman animals are harmed not only by humans but also by each 
other. The tiger will crunch on the ‘tender gazelle’. As with the human capabilities, 
there is a moral element to Nussbaum’s list: she believes that harm-causing capabilities 
of nonhuman animals should not be accorded political and social protection. That is not 
to say that the tiger’s predatory capacity should be ignored altogether; rather she wants 
to strip it of its harmful element and fulfil it in some other way. She cites the Bronx 
Zoo, which has provided its tiger with a ball on a rope, and the games we encourage our 
pet cats to play (for example, chasing paper on a string) whilst discouraging them from 
hunting mice and birds. Nor does she rule out this ‘intelligent, respectful paternalism’ 
when it comes to nonhuman animals in the “wild”. She argues that intervention to 
                                                 
5 Nussbaum (2006, p. 362) does not deny outright that ‘wanton’ killing even of mosquitoes could be an 
injustice, but signs off the topic by noting that ‘we have enough on our plate if we focus for the time 
being on sentient creatures’. 
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protect the gazelle from the tiger and painless population control rather than the crueller 
natural version could be justified if such changes could be introduced without doing 
more harm than good to individual nonhuman animals.6  
 
Functioning as being crunched: Justice to species and systems 
Schlosberg (2007, pp. 142-157) regards Nussbaum’s proposals as too modest. The 
capabilities approach, he says, ‘could enrich ecological justice by bringing recognition 
to the flourishing of systems as a whole as well as the individual animals Nussbaum 
includes’. He accuses Nussbaum of being ‘quite biased towards sentient and even self-
conscious animals – not much of a progression beyond some of the contractualists she 
criticises’. He does not offer a rival capabilities list, but rejects her starting point of the 
list for humans in favour of appeal to the ways of life of species and ecosystems. 
Schlosberg (2007, p. 148) makes two related points. Firstly, he appeals to the 
fact that species and ecosystems, as well as individual nonhuman animals, have their 
own claim to recognition and their own capacity to flourish in their own way. Systems 
are ‘living entities with their own integrity; atomising nature into isolated animals 
devalues a form of life, and the way that this form of life flourishes’. Secondly, he 
argues that it doesn’t make sense to consider the flourishing of individual animals 
(human or otherwise) in isolation: ‘It is simply not possible to talk about the flourishing 
of individual animals without reference to the environment in which this flourishing is 
to occur.’ Nussbaum, as we have seen, would not deny this second point but she would 
not, as he does, defend direct duties to these species or ecosystems. 
In keeping with his wider focus, Schlosberg (2007, pp. 151-2) rejects 
Nussbaum’s idea (2006, p. 379) that we ‘police the animal world, protecting vulnerable 
animals from predators’.7 Echoing the furore over Knut, the polar bear cub rejected by 
his mother in Berlin zoo, he argues that, even within zoos, such sanitisation of the 
                                                 
6 See Cowan (2003) for an alternative defence of “policing nature”.  
7 Schinkel (2008, pp.49-50) also criticises Nussbaum’s proposal, noting that it would mean ‘the end of the 
natural world as we know it’. 
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capabilities of nonhuman animals as giving the ball to the tiger is the result of human 
discomfort and precisely what renders us ‘incapable of fully understanding species-
based capabilities’.8 His point is not simply that Nussbaum is wrong about the true 
nature of flourishing as a tiger, but also that she has too narrow a view of what it means 
to flourish as a gazelle. 
  
If the question is the simultaneous protection of the tiger’s prey… we need to 
understand and accept that part of the flourishing of animals is to be the protein for 
other life forms. All flourishing is not a pretty version of harmony; some is not-so-
pretty, but nonetheless harmonious. To be food for others is the essence of functioning 
for some beings. Acorns can become oak trees, or they may become squirrel food; 
gazelles can breed in social units, or may become tiger food. Either direction represents 
a particular form of flourishing, so long as one recognises that flourishing happens in 
systems, with creatures in relation with one another. (Schlosberg 2007, p. 151) 
 
Conflicting claims 
If Schlosberg is right, the capabilities approach provides not only a theory of social 
justice and justice to individual nonhuman animals but also a broader model of 
ecological justice. Unfortunately, however, it is not at all clear that it is possible to 
achieve all these aims at once. This section will consider four obstacles. The first, the 
persistently conflicting claims of human and nonhuman subjects of justice, is the 
exception in being largely theoretically resolvable. Although presented primarily via 
engagement with Nussbaum, it constitutes a challenge to any theorist attempting to 
expand capabilities-based justice beyond the human. The second difficulty is a more 
enduring one for both Nussbaum and Schlosberg: widespread conflict between the 
capabilities claims of different individual animals. The third obstacle, the 
incompatibility of the capabilities entitlements of nonhuman animals and those of 
                                                 
8 Animal rights activist Frank Albrecht argued that raising Knut by hand was ‘“not appropriate to the 
species but rather a blatant violation of animal welfare laws”’ because he would become dependent on 
humans and unable to function as a bear (Thadeusz 2007). This theory seems to have been borne out by 
experience: within a year, zoologist Peter Arras had described Knut as a psychopath (Paterson 2008).  
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species or ecosystems, is a problem specifically for Schlosberg’s wider approach, as is 
the fourth: the nebulousness of the notion of an “ecosystem”. 
 
Us and them  
The first question is whether justice can be done to nonhumans whilst maintaining just 
human institutions? Here, despite appearances, there is scope for optimism. Within this 
broad topic, I will highlight three difficulties and sketch how each might be resolved.  
The first difficulty relates to a specific feature of Nussbaum’s version of the 
capabilities approach. Her expanded account seems to have a clear-cut answer to some 
questions of animal treatment, for example that nonhuman animals not be sacrificed for 
luxury goods or blood “sports”. It is plausible, although Nussbaum (2006, pp. 393-4) 
refrains from saying so, that justice to sentient nonhuman animals would require 
refraining from killing them for food, or even from consuming animal products.9 
Without the scope to discuss this fully, I point only to the healthiness and potential for 
variety in a vegetarian diet, as indicating that it does not preclude a fully flourishing 
human life, and to the environmental benefits, as indicating that a much lower meat diet 
may in fact be required to do full justice to humans including future generations.  
However, numerous cases are made for maintaining cruel practices on the 
grounds of cultural significance. Halal and kosher slaughter are obvious cases; others 
include bull fighting or Santeria sacrifice. Parallel claims might be made for practices 
threatening the survival of species or ecosystems as a whole. Consider, for example, the 
threat both to individual sentient animals and to species posed by Japanese or Icelandic 
whaling. The point is not that these cultural practices might be claimed as central to 
individuals’ conceptions of the good: parallel arguments to Paula Casal’s (2003) and 
Brian Barry’s (2001, pp. 295-305) could be used to refute such lines of defence. Rather, 
the difficulty is that Nussbaum presents her list of capabilities as one on which there 
                                                 
9 Schinkel (2008) argues that Nussbaum is inconsistent with her own approach in retaining the possibility 
of killing animals for food. For a utilitarian defence of vegetarianism, see Singer 1974. For a rights-based 
defence, see Regan 1983, esp. pp. 330-353. For a discussion of the moral problems of adopting 
vegetarianism but not veganism, see Deckers 2009. 
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could be overlapping consensus among those subjects of justice who are capable of 
consenting, i.e. most adult humans, and as deriving its legitimacy at least in part from 
such consensus. But humans, taken across different cultures, include stalwart defenders 
of precisely the kinds of cruel behaviour listed above. Thus, quite apart from the 
question of whether overlapping consensus among only a minority of its subjects (and 
an interested minority at that) should legitimate a conception of justice, it is highly 
unlikely that an expanded capabilities model could be defended in this way.  
Of course, the capabilities approach need not stand or fall with Rawlsian 
overlapping consensus. Instead, more in line with the earlier Nussbaum (1990), the list 
of capabilities could derive its authority directly from an objective moral stance on the 
value of human (or other) flourishing and a “thick vague” conception of what that 
flourishing involves.10 However, such a shift could come at a heavy cost: for Nussbaum 
as for Rawls, one central motive for seeking overlapping consensus on a conception of 
justice is that it is likely to bring stability in practice.11 
The second difficulty concerns the use of nonhuman animals for medical 
research, which Nussbaum (2006, pp. 403-5) describes as a genuinely tragic conflict. 
Even once the many unnecessary harms currently imposed are excluded as unjust,12 
there remains research necessary to tackle serious human medical conditions, but which 
unavoidably sacrifices the core interests of individual sentient nonhuman animals.  
Here, I suggest, the capabilities approach has two theoretically workable 
options, although Nussbaum is reluctant to take either. Consider the argument as 
follows. Medical research is necessary to aid human beings who have fallen below some 
threshold level of opportunity for health. The question presented by Nussbaum as tragic 
is whether individual nonhuman animals should have their basic capabilities sacrificed 
                                                 
10 The term “thick” is used in contrast to the Rawlsian liberal account, on which primary goods (rights, 
liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, the social bases of self respect) serve, for political purposes, 
as a proxy or “thin” conception of the good. However, the capabilities list is vague in refraining from 
prescribing any particular way of life, as would, for example, a comprehensive religious view of the good. 
(See Nussbaum 1990, p. 210; Rawls 1971, p. 54) 
11 See for example Nussbaum 2000, p. 152; Rawls 1993, pp. 385-394 
12 For example, replication of research by competing scientists. For a discussion of this point, see 
Nussbaum 2006, pp. 403-4, or Nuffield Council of Bioethics 2005 
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in pursuit of justice for those unfortunate humans. But it could equally well be asked 
whether otherwise healthy humans should be used in the same way in pursuit of the 
same aim. The capabilities theorist, like most theorists of justice, would say no. There is 
an almost universally accepted unacceptability to using others as a means in this way. 
Individuals can demand threshold-level capabilities but only up to the point where 
providing them would actively undermine the key capabilities of other individuals. 
With this in mind, the capabilities theorist has two options. One is to affirm that 
the entitlements of individual nonhuman animals are on a par with those of individual 
humans. Then, for consistency, the approach would have to rule against nonhuman 
animal testing. Nussbaum stops short of this.13 The other option – from which she also 
explicitly refrains – is to take a stance on the moral inequality of humans and 
nonhumans, perhaps by appeal to our greater complexity or self-awareness.14 The claim 
would then be that, although it is of moral value that an individual sentient animal, 
ecosystem or species flourishes, it is more so that a human individual does so. Thus, 
although they could not be sacrificed for any lesser end and only for this one given an 
unavoidable clash, nonhuman interests are ultimately trumped by human interests. 
The final conflict is more general: are there adequate resources at our disposal to 
do justice to all humans, nonhuman animals, species and ecosystems, in the sense of 
meeting their claim to threshold-level capabilities? That is, even leaving aside more 
immediate practical difficulties, such as vested interests and the absence of political 
will, is even a mostly “just world” in this expanded sense achievable? Or is there such 
scarcity that, to anticipate the discussion of the next full section, we are outside the 
circumstances within which capabilities justice is even theoretically possible and so, 
arguably, outside those to which the model is even applicable? 
There are some grounds for optimism. To some extent, given the interconnection 
of humans and the natural world, the two projects – justice for humans and justice for 
                                                 
13 Nussbaum 2006, pp. 403-405. Schinkel (2008, pp. 50-62) argues that this is inconsistent with 
Nussbaum’s own claim (2006, p. 315) that on her model ‘no creature is being used as a means to the ends 
of others, or of society as a whole’.  
14 Nussbaum 2006, p. 380-4 
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nonhumans broadly understood – should complement each other. At the widest level, in 
provoking catastrophic climate change or global scale ecosystem collapse, we are 
destroying ourselves. Moreover, Nussbaum (2000, p. 80) specifies as her eighth central 
capability, Other Species, ‘[b]eing able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants, and the world of nature’. However, Other Species is the most 
controversial of Nussbaum’s capability categories.15 Nor is it plausible, even if it is 
admitted to the list, that human flourishing requires the preservation of all species. Nor 
does the fact that we need the “natural world” in general mean that our interests will not 
clash with those of small-scale ecosystems within it. Indeed, the Living Planet Report 
(Hails et al. 2008, p. 4) identifies five direct, anthropogenic threats to biodiversity: 
‘habitat loss, fragmentation of change, especially due to agriculture; overexploitation of 
species, especially due to fishing and hunting; pollution; the spread of invasive species 
or genes; climate change’.  
Of course, much of this destructive approach to other species and ecosystems 
has served luxury human ends and so does not strictly speaking demonstrate a conflict 
between humans’ capability claims and those of species and ecosystems. However, 
adequate support for all species under threat of extinction and active provision of 
capabilities for all ecosystems would be hugely expensive. A similar point can be made 
regarding individual nonhumans. To give the capabilities approach the benefit of the 
doubt, we might take as resolved the question (to be debated below) of whether 
Schlosberg can convincingly reject Nussbaum’s conclusions on prey-predator relations. 
But even without the need for wholesale intervention, fulfilling positive capabilities-
based responsibilities would involve the provision of adequate food, space and health 
(or at the very least palliative) care. 
Even remaining agnostic on the empirical question of whether such measures 
could currently be afforded alongside securing human capabilities, they certainly would 
                                                 




not remain so if the human population continued to grow.16 As Hails et al. (2008, pp. 
22-23) point out, our ecological footprint (the amount of biologically productive land 
and water needed to meet human resource and waste demand) is a function of 
population size, goods and services consumed per capita, and the resource- and waste 
intensity of those goods and services. Given a big enough human population, even 
increased waste-efficiency and a reduction in consumption to the levels required for 
threshold level capabilities would be insufficient to prevent ecological overshoot (of 
ecological footprint over the earth’s capacity), never mind achieve positive capabilities 
justice for nonhuman animals, species and ecosystems. 
That is not to say that the capabilities theorist must choose between justice for 
humans and justice for nonhumans. The approach can avoid widespread conflict 
between legitimate claims, but only if its advocates are prepared to acknowledge that 
institutionally unchecked human population growth constitutes an injustice to 
nonhumans. Then, depending on whether the resources of the earth are currently such 
as to accommodate capabilities justice for nonhuman animals, species and ecosystems 
as well as for humans, the approach would have to require a programme of either global 
population reduction or stabilisation. It would of course be a challenge to achieve this 
whilst upholding key human capabilities such as Bodily Integrity, which includes 
‘opportunities… for choice in matters of reproduction’ (Nussbaum 2000, p. 78). 
However, it is not necessarily impossible. States and global institutions can use 
incentive structures and education rather than coercive measures, and it is at least 
arguable that opportunity for reproductive choice is ensured if there is a genuine choice 
of having (or not having) even one or two children. 
 
Flourishing as not being crunched 
                                                 
16 It is currently predicted to do so: from 6.8 billion in 2010 to 9.15 billion in 2050 according to the 
Optimum Population Trust (www.optimumpopulation.org) 
  
12 
So far, so promising for the capabilities approach. However, other areas of conflict 
prove harder to resolve. The first is between individual sentient animals, specifically 
prey and predator. 
This is a problem for Nussbaum’s account. In correcting her mistake about what 
it means to flourish as a tiger – ‘[t]igers hunt, and eat other animals; they only play with 
balls when deprived of that capability’ – Schlosberg (2007, p. 152) presents an 
objection to her already counterintuitive proposal of policing nature to secure the 
entitlements of individual animals. However, it is also a difficulty for his project of 
expanding the capabilities approach to include species, ecosystems and individual 
animals, because it is hard to see how full-blooded capabilities justice could be done to 
individuals including the “tender gazelle” without such policing. In his 2007 
monograph, Schlosberg suggests that the difficulty does not arise because failure to 
protect the gazelle from the tiger – or, indeed, supplying it to the tiger in the zoo – is no 
injustice to the individual gazelle. However, the explanation for this is highly 
problematic and indeed is implicitly rejected by his recent unpublished work.17 
The difficulty is this: having accused Nussbaum of conflating species and 
ecosystems (Schlosberg 2007, p. 148), Schlosberg appears to conflate the flourishing of 
the individual and the flourishing of the species in attempting to avoid sanitising nature 
whilst preserving a concern for all individual animals. Recall his claim that ‘part of the 
flourishing of animals is to be the protein for other life forms… To be food for others is 
the essence of functioning for some beings. Acorns can become oak trees, or they may 
become squirrel food; gazelles can breed in social units, or may become tiger food.’ 
This is convincing, so long as it concerns the species as a whole, whose flourishing in a 
                                                 
17 Schlosberg (unpublished) clarifies his position in a paper to the American Political Science 
Association, 2009, acknowledging that individual animals are sacrificed for the stability of overall 
ecosystems and accordingly that there is potential for conflict between capabilities. However, he remains 
committed to the aim of recognising the claims of ecosystems, species and individuals, arguing that 
potential conflicts should not be taken as a reason to reject a notion of justice to natural systems and that 
ways of addressing the conflicts can be further developed going forward. But if the arguments of the next 
section (“Outside the circumstances of justice?”) are correct, the situation is so far from being one in 
which conventional capabilities justice could ever be achieved for all, as to call for a revised approach. 
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context of limited resources will presumably benefit from population control and the 
weeding out of the least fit.  
However, it is hard to see how a painful death courtesy of a tiger can be said to 
contribute to the flourishing life of that individual gazelle, any more than heavy work 
loads and having no control over their own lives could be said to contribute to the 
flourishing of individual slaves in Ancient Rome, even if it was integral to maintaining 
the overall social system. If nonhuman animals, as sentient individuals, have interests in 
anything, they have interests in avoiding pain and suffering. It may be integral to the 
system that the gazelle be hunted down; it may be part of the functioning of the species 
that it is food for another species; but to say that it is part of the functioning of that 
particular gazelle to be so overlooks precisely the concern for the capacity of individual 
animal lives to go better or worse that Nussbaum wants to recognise.18 
 
Killing the animal, saving the system 
Schlosberg’s expanded model also faces conflict between the capabilities-based 
entitlements of individual nonhuman animals and those of species or ecosystems. Here, 
it is helpful to distinguish between human-caused conflicts, on which I suggest the 
approach can convincingly adjudicate, and natural conflicts, which present it with a 
widespread and more substantial difficulty. 
Beginning with the former, Elizabeth Anderson (2004, pp. 277-9) makes the 
point that advocates of animal welfare, advocates of animal rights and advocates of 
environmental ethics want different, often conflicting, things. She cites feral pigs 
destroying the Hawaiian rainforest and rabbits in Australia. Such cases also appear to 
present Schlosberg’s capabilities model with a dilemma. Protecting the rainforest 
requires us to kill the pigs; protecting the Australian bush requires us to kill the rabbits, 
which has historically been done in a particularly painful way. Similarly, attempts in 
Scotland to preserve the native red squirrel from extinction include encouraging land 
                                                 
18 Cochrane (2007, pp. 314-6) makes a parallel point. 
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owners to kill grey squirrels.19 Such methods fail to respect the capabilities-entitlements 
of individual nonhuman animals but not to interfere would allow an ecosystem or 
species to struggle. How can an approach committed to providing threshold-level 
capabilities for both possibly adjudicate?  
It can, I suggest, because of something specific in the way the situation arose: 
humans have undermined the integrity of an ecosystem and threatened native species by 
introducing a destructive non-native species. Thus, these are second best situations, 
where an injustice has already been done. Acknowledging this, the capabilities 
approach can propose a second-best solution: an attempt to provide rectificatory justice 
to the species or system (restore threshold-level capabilities) whilst minimising further 
injustices in the process, probably by using the least painful method available of 
extermination or sterilisation.20  
The zoo example, on which Nussbaum and Schlosberg disagree, is another 
second-best situation, although a still more problematic one. Being kept in captivity 
undermines the tiger’s capacity to live a full flourishing life. The question then becomes 
one of rectifying an existing injustice (restoring capabilities) so far as possible whilst 
minimising the impact on other subjects of justice. Unless it is feasible to release it into 
its natural habitat, this might, other things being equal, mandate painless extermination 
of the tiger. But a case can be made against this by appeal to the species. Captive 
breeding is sometimes a response to an earlier injustice: the fact that humans have, 
through some combination of climate change, hunting and habitat destruction, 
threatened the survival of a species of nonhuman animal.21  
This situation is thus doubly second best. At first glance, in parallel with the 
Anderson cases above, the least unjust solution might appear to be a diet of free range, 
humanely killed meat, combined with some way of mimicking the tiger’s hunting 
experience (although the Knut experience suggests that such programmes should be 
                                                 
19 See for example www.red-squirrels.org.uk 
20 Singer (2003, p. 59) also makes the case for painless sterilisation in such situations.  
21 For recent data on the impact of human activity on nonhuman species, see Hails et al., 2008, pp. 6-13. 
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undertaken warily). However, this glosses over a distinction between this case and those 
above. The pigs, rabbits or grey squirrels pose an innocent but severe threat to other 
subjects of justice. It is therefore in line with many intuitions in parallel human cases 
that they can legitimately be sacrificed to protect those under threat, in this case the 
ecosystem, native species and native individual animals.22 Here, by contrast, the animal 
sacrificed does not itself constitute the threat. Is it not then unacceptable to use it as a 
means to feed the captive tiger? If it is, the capabilities approach might have to mandate 
feeding captive tigers alternative proteins, derived from vegetable sources, which seems 
decidedly unsatisfactory by way of rectification to the individual tiger.23  
However, conflicts arise not only as a result of human action but also, on a 
massive scale, because of the way the natural world operates. This is brought out by the 
discussion above of the tiger and gazelle. Schlosberg, as we saw, is convincing on what 
is required for the flourishing of the tiger, individual and species, and of the species 
gazelle. He also points plausibly to the contribution of predation to the flourishing of the 
ecosystem within which tiger and gazelle co-exist. Nonetheless, it is entirely 
implausible that being eaten by a tiger could contribute to the flourishing of the 
individual gazelle. In other words, doing justice to the individual gazelle is not only 
incompatible with doing justice to the individual tiger, but also with doing justice to the 
gazelle’s own species, or a given population within it. 
                                                 
22 Consider, for example, arguments in favour of late abortion when the mother’s life is in danger or 
Regan’s example (1983, pp. 293-5) of the gun-wielding child. 
23 Cecile Fabre has brought to my attention the related question of whether we should require our pet cats 
and dogs to be vegetarian. This prompts the wider point: is keeping pets unjust? Without space for a full 
discussion, I will note on the broader point that the conditions in which many pets are kept clearly 
undermines their key capabilities (e.g. caged birds or rodents). It is at least arguable that other pets, who 
can be given scope to live relatively freely and who have bred over generations to live with humans, can 
have a fully flourishing life. On the narrower question, preventing cats from killing for food whilst 
feeding them meat from ill treated animals raises exactly the kind of charges of inconsistency and 
sanitisation that Schlosberg (2007, p. 150) raises against Nussbaum. However, given that domestic cats 
already pose a threat to bird populations, it seems maintaining rather than correcting an injustice to 
encourage them to hunt their own food. Even free range meat looks like an injustice on the same grounds 
as feeding it to the captive tiger. So perhaps the capabilities theorist does have to recommend feeding 
carnivorous pets meat substitutes. This, however, re-opens the broader question. Can a cat have a fully 
flourishing life if it is vegetarian and effectively prevented from hunting, i.e. without injustice being done 
to other animals? If not, then the capabilities theorist might have to conclude that it is unjust to keep pets.  
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A possible response would be to stress, as Schlosberg does, that individuals 
flourish within ecosystems and species. The survival of (and so flourishing of) each 
individual gazelle depends on the survival of the species, but this does not show that 
there is no more to the flourishing of each sentient individual than that of the species, or 
that the two cannot conflict. Consider a parallel case: ten people in a lifeboat which can 
only hold nine. The survival of any depends on one going overboard. Thus it can be said 
to be in each individual’s interest that one be sacrificed. It is not, however, in any 
individual’s interest that she be sacrificed. 
According to Schlosberg (2007, p. 152), ‘a focus on systems gets us away from 
dilemmas, such as doing justice to individual animals in a larger ecosystem’. But what 
his “focus” on systems actually comes down to in such situations is not doing 
Nussbaumian, capabilities justice to individual animals. This, as with the clashing 
claims of prey and predator but unlike those of humans and nonhumans, does indeed 
look like a case of tragic conflict. 
 
Justice to which ecosystem? 
The fourth problem is also specific to Schlosberg’s expansion of the capabilities 
approach beyond individual nonhuman animals. It becomes apparent when we ask to 
which ecosystems we are supposed to be doing justice. As already noted, at the broadest 
level the whole world is an ecosystem, of which we ourselves are a part and which we 
need in order to survive. Within this, individual ecosystems are not fixed or finite. They 
are constantly developing as the beings within them act, develop and respond. 
Ecosystems also develop and evolve in response to external events, some of which are 
naturally caused, others of which are caused by the behaviour of sentient nonhuman 
animals, and still others of which are caused by humans.  
Given this, there are two related dangers. The first is that attempting to uphold 
the threshold-level capabilities of those ecosystems could involve futile and ultimately 
counterproductive attempts to hold time still. The second is that of ruling out all human 
interaction with the natural world. Schlosberg, who does not present a Nussbaum-style  
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list, owes us an account of the central capabilities of ecosystems which can avoid both 
of these dangers whilst still maintaining the idea of fulfilling some positive duty to 
ecosystems. If such an account cannot be produced, the capabilities theorist might have 
to consider other ways to uphold the claims of the natural world, for example following 
Baxter (2005, pp. 127-131) whose account of ecological justice as impartiality takes 
populations within at least nonsentient species to be the ‘appropriate bearers of claims 
to environmental resources’.24 
However, the idea of doing positive justice to species (or populations within 
them) is also problematic, given the non-anthropogenic processes of change also 
affecting them. A great many extinctions are anthropogenic. This, already common 
knowledge, is abundantly and depressingly confirmed by Hails et al. (2008, pp. 2-13).25 
But not all are. What happens if a species goes out of existence entirely free from 
human interference (an event which is perfectly plausible although admittedly harder to 
foresee – and harder still to identify – as the impact of climate change increases)? Does 
institutional failure to prevent this really constitute an injustice, especially given that it 
is part of the process of evolution which upholds that one giant ecosystem, the world, 
within which we all exist?  
 
Outside the circumstances of justice 
The above conflicts are more than merely practical difficulties with implementing 
capabilities justice, understood as underwriting threshold-level capabilities, for 
nonhuman animals, species and ecosystems. They are, I suggest, so much a product of 
                                                 
24 Along these lines, the capabilities approach might identify species (but not ecosystems) as the subject 
of justice, but specify it as a prima facie injustice to the species if a population within it is destroyed or 
maimed by institutional or institutionally condoned human action. To avoid destroying populations within 
an existing ecosystem, it will generally be necessary to avoid destroying the ecosystem. However, if an 
ecosystem has already been destroyed or changed beyond recognition, the requirement would not 
necessarily be to replace the original, but rather to attempt to find a place within the new system, or 
elsewhere, for the evicted population, or failing that to make efforts to conserve the species in its other 
populations. 
25 According to the Living Planet Index, vertebrate species populations declined by nearly 30 per cent 
from 1970 to 2005, while human demand on the biosphere more than doubled from 1961 to 2005. 
  
18 
the combination of this understanding of justice and the circumstances within which the 
subjects of the expanded approach find themselves, as to constitute a more fundamental 
problem. 
Consider how the situation for which the capabilities approach was originally 
designed differs from those in which Nussbaum, and especially Schlosberg, operate. 
The ideal of the just modern human society is cooperation for mutual advantage and 
individual flourishing for all members. We are assumed to be in circumstances within 
which that is broadly possible, at least in theory: we are not entirely altruistic and our 
luxury demands exceed the resources at our disposal, but our needs are sufficiently 
compatible and our resources sufficiently adequate that it would be at least theoretically 
possible to meet the threshold entitlements of almost all.26 The very functioning of 
“natural” societies, or ecosystems, however, revolves around the sacrifice of the 
individual. 
There are two related points here. Firstly, certain individual nonhuman animals 
are in a state of persistent conflict. This is not a new point. For example, Baxter (2005, 
p. 87) stresses the need to revise the concept of justice to accommodate entities ‘which 
routinely attack and harm moral agents… as the result of the workings of their inner 
nature’. However, it is a problematic one for the project of expanding the capabilities 
approach: given the plausibility of Schlosberg’s view that predation is a central 
component of the flourishing of a tiger, combined with the implausibility of the idea that 
being painfully killed is compatible with the flourishing of an individual gazelle, any 
project targeting threshold-level capabilities for all individual nonhuman animals 
appears doomed from the outset.  
The point is not that there are some tragic conflicts. Even a humans-only theory 
of justice will face tragic conflicts. Drawing on Dworkin (2000, p. 60-61), consider 
those unfortunate individuals who are so handicapped that their capabilities can only be 
increased at huge cost to society and then not necessarily to threshold level. However, 
                                                 
26 These are broadly the circumstances of justice outlined by Rawls (1971, pp.109-110), drawing on 
Hume (1740, pp. 494-5). 
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these are exceptions in the human case. Once the model is extended to include 
nonhumans, conflicts occur consistently between prey and predator even when each is 
entirely normally functioning. Indeed, they do so precisely because the flourishing of 
individual animals (as a species-norm, not an exception) requires the undermining of the 
capabilities of others. By contrast, although humans are depressingly given to the 
destruction both of each other and of other species, we do not in general need to do so in 
order to flourish. 
Secondly, relatedly, the standard capabilities approach eschews strong 
communitarianism. It avoids assigning value to human social systems, whilst 
acknowledging the instrumental importance of socio-political contexts to the 
individuals within them.27 However, Schlosberg’s argument rests on the view that the 
flourishing of ecosystems cannot be reduced to that of the sentient individual animals 
within them. But if individual nonhuman animals, species and ecosystems cannot 
simultaneously have their capabilities-based entitlements met, because of inevitable and 
widespread conflict between those entitlements, the situation is no longer one hampered 
only by moderate scarcity and selfishness, so that a system of distributive justice is both 
necessary and theoretically workable. It is one in which justice, understood as the 
positive guarantee of some threshold level flourishing for all, is ruled out by the very 
nature of its subjects. 
 
Where now for the capabilities approach? 
The main aim of this paper was to assess whether the capabilities model, as expanded 
by Nussbaum and again by Schlosberg, could live up to its highly compelling promise 
                                                 
27 Schlosberg himself is an exception, appealing to the capabilities approach to uphold the claims of 
human communities as well as human individuals (Schlosberg 2007, esp. pp. 35-37 and 92-6, and 
unpublished). This goes some way towards explaining why he does not see the incompatibility of 
individual and species or ecosystem entitlements as a particular impediment to expanding capabilities 
justice to the nonhuman world. But it does not solve the problem: either the flourishing of human 
communities does not routinely require the suppression of individual capabilities, in which case there 
remains a key difference between the human and nonhuman situations, or it does, in which case 
Schlosberg has more difficulties rather than less. Then, in the human as in the nonhuman case, justice, 
understood as the positive provision of threshold capabilities, would be simply impossible.  
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of doing justice to humans, nonhuman animals, species and systems. I have concluded 
that it cannot. Before ending, however, I wish briefly to consider the question of how 
the capabilities approach might progress beyond this impasse.  
It could, of course, limit its ambitions and assign the protection of 
institutionally-backed justice either to only individual nonhuman animals or only to 
species and ecosystems, leaving the protection of the other to individual duties. The 
former is Nussbaum’s strategy (2006, p. 357): whilst expanding the sphere of justice 
only to sentient individual nonhuman animals, she allows that the survival of a species 
could have ‘aesthetic significance, scientific significance or some other sort of ethical 
significance’. The latter might be defended as one natural expansion of Schlosberg’s 
position.  
However, there are difficulties. Firstly, the problems raised above for the 
expanded capabilities approach were not limited to conflicting claims of individuals on 
the one hand, and species or ecosystems on the other. Rather, it was argued that the 
capabilities claims of individual animals would be in persistent conflict, and that the 
whole notion of doing justice to ecosystems was problematically ambiguous.   
Secondly, there is a difficulty with the status of the individual duties suggested 
above. Their aesthetic, scientific or other ethical significance might give us, as 
individuals, a duty not to destroy species or systems (or, conversely, not to harm 
individual animals). However, those who did not accept such duties could hardly be 
relied upon to fulfil them, without institutional authority to demand it. There might be 
scope for at least some institutional protection for species and ecosystems within 
Nussbaumian societies, or conversely for individual nonhuman animals in a society 
where only species and systems have direct claims on the basic structure of society. 
That is, in the same way as Derek Bell (2006, pp. 382-402) suggests that some 
principles of ecological justice could be built into a Rawlsian liberal state: for reasons 
grounded in the comprehensive ecological doctrines of some members of that state. 
However, this would be limited, being contingent on there being enough ecologically 
motivated individuals. Moreover, such institutional duties would not be the ‘first virtue 
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of institutions’ (Rawls 1971, p. 3) and could only come second to the claims of those 
protected by justice.  
Thus, both possibilities have difficult implications: on the one hand, at least a 
prima facie case for radical and wholesale transformation of the natural world to protect 
individuals but no guarantee of state protection for endangered species and/or 
ecosystems, especially those not containing sentient animals; on the other, potential 
state non-interference with severe harm to individual animals (from bear baiting to 
factory farming) so long as the core capabilities of species or systems were not thereby 
threatened. Such implications are particularly problematic for any capabilities theorist 
hoping to expand the model whilst retaining Nussbaum’s Rawlsian allegiance. Given 
the conflict with what many people, on either side, actually regard as important, it 
seems unlikely to the point of impossibility that overlapping consensus could be 
achieved on either strategy. However, they also reflect a more general quandary for the 
capabilities theorist. 
This, put bluntly, is that both Nussbaum and Schlosberg seem to be onto 
something. Is it an injustice if an oil spill causes the painful death of a polar bear and 
neither state governments nor international institutions do anything to prevent it, if a 
snow leopard is legally hunted down, or if a calf is kept (again legally) in dark isolation 
before being bled to death? I am inclined to think it is, although the former raises 
questions beyond the scope of this paper, regarding the applicability of rules of justice 
outside existing formalised institutional structures.28 But there seems to be something 
further going wrong in the first two cases that is not captured by the harm to the 
individual: something to do with the fact that, as a result of human activity, the species 
polar bear and snow leopard are likely to become extinct. The challenge is to capture 
both of these elements without giving rise to widespread tragic conflict. The rest of this 
                                                 
28 On the debate between cosmopolitans and political liberals, see for example Beitz 1975 and 1983, 
Pogge 2002, Nagel 2005 and Caney 2007. However, this paper takes Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan position 
as its starting point. 
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paper will outline two possible ways in which the capabilities approach might attempt to 
meet it. 
 
Risk and flourishing 
One option for the approach would be to remain true to Schlosberg’s idea of capabilities 
justice as upholding core capabilities for all, but find a better way to demonstrate that 
this is compatible with widespread failure to protect prey from predator. One way in 
which this might be done is by focusing on the extent to which risk to key capabilities 
can, because it is itself necessary to flourishing, be compatible with justice.  
Consider a recent proposal by a group of scientists: that Old World cheetahs be 
introduced into North American grasslands to replicate the role played by the extinct 
American cheetah (Donlan et al, 2006, pp. 661-9).29 Part of their reasoning is that 
predation by cheetahs ‘purportedly played a pivotal role in shaping the pronghorn’s 
astounding speed’ and their absence has left the pronghorn (a mammal resembling an 
antelope) ‘overbuilt… in precisely those traits that make it so distinctive among North 
American mammals’. The relevant idea, for present purposes, is that the pronghorn has 
attributes it is unable fully to use. This could suggest that the individual cannot flourish 
fully as a pronghorn unless it is given a reason to run fast, i.e. a genuine threat of being 
killed by a very fast big cat. Thus, quite apart from the benefit to the species, it might be 
in the individual pronghorn’s interest to run a risk of being killed by a cheetah.  
This is not entirely out of line with the experience of some humans, for example 
high altitude mountaineers, who have developed a plan of life on which flourishing 
involves taking certain major risks, although it remains as implausible that it is part of 
the healthy individual pronghorn’s flourishing actually to be eaten, as it would be to say 
that it contributed to the flourishing of free climber John Bachar that he fell to his death 
from Dike Wall (The Economist 2009). Indeed, in a closer parallel still, James Hatley 
                                                 
29 My thanks to Paul Knights for bringing this research to my attention. 
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(2004) has highlighted the significance of wilderness areas by appeal to the ‘uncanny 
goodness’ of being ourselves sometimes vulnerable to predation.30 
Thus, the capabilities theorist might resurrect Schlosberg’s attempt to reconcile 
predation with the flourishing of the individual gazelle. However, any such argument 
would require a huge amount more work, both scientific and philosophical. Firstly, 
there are important distinctions between human risk-takers and prey animals: the 
potentially valuable risk to the pronghorn is both a species-norm (rather than specific to 
the individual and, for many human risk-takers, self-chosen) and a significantly high 
one run as part of its everyday life (unlike in the case of humans visiting wilderness 
areas). It is considered explicitly unjust on the capabilities approach that individual 
humans should have to take high risks with some capabilities in order to secure others.31 
Secondly, it is far from clear that Donlan et al. either show or intend to show that 
the individual pronghorn is benefited by exercising its capacity to run at speed; inability 
fully to utilise evolutionarily acquired traits might disadvantage only the species. 
Thirdly, it would also have to be demonstrated that predation was the only way in which 
the pronghorn could be enabled to exercise its capacity for speed. Finally, a parallel case 
would have to be made for prey-predator relations across the board. 
 
Justice as collective non-interference 
The second possibility also draws on the idea that justice for nonhumans, though 
potentially equally important, need not be the same as justice for humans. However, it 
involves a significant modification to the capabilities approach. The basic idea of the 
approach is that “we”, as institutionalised collectivities of human beings, owe each one 
of us the social and material support needed to achieve threshold-level capabilities. 
Certainly, the potential to flourish of nonhuman animals and the so-called natural world 
could also ground strong entitlements. But perhaps what they are owed (precisely 
                                                 
30 Simon Hailwood (unpublished) has used Hatley’s idea of edibility as necessary to embodied animality 
as an objection to Nussbaum, who proposes preventing predation but also emphasises that very embodied 
animality among the commonalities of humans and nonhumans. 
31 Consider Sen’s example (1999, p. 8) of Kader Mia, who was obliged to risk his life in order to work.  
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because that is how we can best respect their integrity) is simply that humans not 
undermine their central capabilities. 
That is not to say that those human duties (not to undermine nonhuman 
capabilities) are individual duties beyond the realm of institutional control. Quite the 
contrary: the idea, broadly, would be that the impact of humans on the nonhuman world 
falls within the scope of justice, while intra-nature relations do not. This might be 
expressed by appeal to a collectivised version of the distinction between positive and 
negative duties. 
To elaborate, consider how the capabilities of individual animals, species and 
ecosystems are undermined by humans acting on various levels: individually, as when a 
child torments a kitten, a farmer confines a veal calf or a tourist leaves a cigarette alight 
in the Australian bush; institutionally, as when a burger chain uses crate-grown meat or 
government-authorised logging firms destroy the rain forest; and collectively, as when 
anthropogenic climate change threatens the survival of the polar bear. On the suggested 
model, the capabilities approach could defend a duty of justice to ensure that such 
harms were prevented and to compensate for past injuries, as far as possible, through 
restoration of capabilities. Political institutions would be required to be framed to fulfil 
such responsibilities. However, it would not count as a failure of justice if human 
institutions failed to protect the gazelle from the tiger, at least in their natural habitat. 
Given the distance between this model and Nussbaum’s core idea of justice as 
the positive guarantee of threshold-level capabilities for all, some might quibble with 
my using the term “justice” for nonhumans at all. However, what is being suggested 
could appropriately be termed justice, if justice is to be understood as institutionalised 
respect for the basic claims that each of us has on the political and social structures 
under which, voluntarily or involuntarily, we find ourselves. That is not to say, 
however, that the terminology should not reflect the distinction, perhaps by referring to 
justice as non-interference, or protective justice, to exclude the explicitly distributive 
element owed to human beings. 
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By focusing on collective non-interference rather than active provision of 
threshold-level capabilities, it would be possible to avoid Nussbaum’s conclusions on 
the sanitisation of nature, without taking the implausible line that being painfully eaten 
by a tiger does not undermine an individual gazelle’s flourishing. It would also render 
the project of doing justice to nature far less costly, in terms of the opportunity also to 
do justice to humans. Moreover, the capabilities approach would no longer have to 
specify exactly what would be required to raise each ecosystem to threshold level. Nor, 
indeed, would it be required to preserve species under threat for non-anthropogenic 
reasons. 
However, not all is gained: justice, on this conception, would still require such 
changes in human behaviour as to render cross-cultural overlapping consensus highly 
improbable. Nor would the capabilities approach be absolved of the need expressly to 
accommodate the issue of population. If the human population continues to grow, a 
point will inevitably be reached where simply providing all humans with food and 
housing could plausibly require sacrificing ecosystems, species and, through habitat 
destruction, individual nonhuman animals.32 Nor can the problems raised by the 
nebulous nature of ecosystems entirely be evaded simply by ruling that humans should 
“leave ecosystems alone”. Humans are part of ecosystems, and need them. Thus, the 
capabilities theorist, if she is to retain a focus on systems rather than species and 
populations, still owes us an account of the central capabilities of ecosystems which can 
explain the injustice of (say) dumping pollutants into a delicate river ecosystem or 
mass-scale logging in a rainforest, without in the process ruling out all human 
interaction with the natural world.  
Moreover, the modified approach faces at least two challenges of its own. The 
first is as follows. The approach suggested would advocate positive duties to secure 
capabilities for those individual animals, species and ecosystems that are already the 
victims of injustice, while those to whom there has not been any previous injustice 
                                                 
32 Recall the earlier discussion of Hails et al., 2008 
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should simply be protected from human action that would undermine their basic 
capabilities. But, given how much harm we have already done to the natural world, is 
not every situation second best?33 Is not the zoo example, above, simply an instance of 
an almost universal problem? 
There is a possible response to this. Certainly, the level of damage already done 
is so great that we do plausibly owe positive restorative duties on a huge scale. 
However, not all ecosystems, and certainly not all individual “wild” animals, are owed 
such positive duties. Moreover, even in a world pervaded by injustice, there are 
advantages to being able to say what a just one would look like. The idea that a past 
harm is being corrected, albeit imperfectly, can be used to make sense of the decision to 
interfere in certain conflicts between species or systems and individuals but not others – 
and especially not in conflicts between individual animals in their natural habitat. 
However, it is questionable how long such a distinction could be maintained, given the 
across-the-board impact of global warming.  
There is, moreover, a subpoint to be acknowledged: at least some human use of 
animals (for example, the keeping of some pets) might be compatible with justice 
because it would not involve undermining central capabilities.34 However, such 
nonhuman animals might plausibly be owed positive provision of key threshold-level 
capabilities as they would be unable fully to fend for themselves.35  
The second challenge is theoretical as well as practical. It might be argued that 
adopting this collective positive-negative distinction is the best way of maintaining the 
overall system within which nonhuman animals flourish. Thus it could ultimately be 
necessary in order to respect their potential to do so. But, in terms of philosophical 
consistency, can the line be drawn at human beings, both in terms of what is owed and 
what actions can legitimately be curtailed by institutions?  
                                                 
33 Nussbaum (2006, pp. 373-5) makes a similar point in rejecting a positive-negative duty distinction with 
respect to nonhuman animals. 
34 See Footnote 23.  
35 Indeed, Nussbaum’s account more plausible in its application to animals under direct human control 
than to those which are not, although, as we have seen, she is unconvincing (and arguably inconsistent) 
on the circumstances under which such control is itself justifiable. 
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To draw such a line, the capabilities approach would have to provide an account 
of what it is about humans (all humans) that requires that they be given the resources 
and social structures necessary to overcome even natural impediments to flourishing, 
when nonhuman animals (however advanced in capacities) can demand only that 
humans not interfere with their potential to flourish. It is not immediately clear that such 
an account is available. Given that the starting point for the approach is the moral 
significance of the flourishing of each subject of justice, human or nonhuman, it is hard 
to see why the residents of a human village decimated by a hurricane should be entitled 
to state support, but a population of chimpanzees whose habitat is similarly destroyed 
not be so. Equally, why should a deer run over by a car have a claim on us for a quick 
and painless death, but not a deer maimed and abandoned by some natural predator? In 
either case, to paraphrase Nussbaum (2006, p. 379), it is the same for the deer.36  
It is worth noting, before closing, that some of these points might be resolved 
within a version of the capabilities approach which incorporated elements of both the 
possible strategies above: that is, which adopted a collective interference approach but 
defended it at least in part by appeal to the importance to individual animals of running 
certain risks. But even if this argument could be adequately filled out, the chimpanzee 
and the deer would remain problematic cases. The chimpanzee is threatened not by a 
longstanding predator with whom it shares an established system; and to euthanise the 
deer would not be to interfere in the relation between it and the predator which has now 
abandoned it. Thus, the suggested ways forward for the capabilities approach, whether 
taken separately or as a hybrid, remain very much that: tentative suggestions.  
 
                                                 
36 One response to the second point appeals to the fact that the driver is a moral agent. This is the line 
taken by Regan (1983, pp. 284-5). However, his rights view is distinct from the model proposed here, as 
it focuses on individual humans as duty-holders, rather than on the collective responsibility of institutions 
to uphold entitlements. Moreover, this leaves the problem of marginal cases: humans who are not moral 
agents. The capabilities approach would consider it the duty of the relevant human institution to protect 
the deer from capabilities-violations inflicted by severely mentally handicapped humans, or indeed by 
animals under human control. An account is therefore owing of why justice does not at least require 
euthanising the deer if a tiger has left it to a painful death, given it suffers as much either way. (It is also 
unclear how Regan would accommodate such harms by humans who are not moral agents.) 
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This paper has identified obstacles to the expansions of the capabilities approach 
proposed by Nussbaum and Schlosberg. It has also shown that these reflect an 
underlying impediment to any attempt to take capabilities justice, understood as 
defending the positive provision of certain capability entitlements for all subjects of 
justice, beyond the human. But that is not to say that we should abandon the capabilities 
approach altogether as a way of incorporating the claims of nonhumans into our 
political theory. I hope this last section has indicated as much. I remain convinced that 
this is an essential debate and one to which the capabilities approach has a great deal 
more to contribute. This paper is intended in the spirit of constructive criticism, to 




Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the New Voices in Politics Seminar, 
Newcastle University, 22 January 2009, the Research Seminar in Political Theory, 
University of Edinburgh, 30 January 2009, and the 8th Global Conference in 
Environmental Justice and Global Citizenship, Mansfield College, Oxford, 10 July 
2009. It has greatly benefited from the discussion on all three occasions. I am also 
indebted for highly constructive written comments to Jan Deckers, Hannah Droop, 




Anderson, Elizabeth. 2004. ‘Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life’. In 
Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein and Martha 
Nussbaum, 277-9. New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell 
 




Beitz, Charles. 1975. ‘Justice and International Relations’. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 4: 360-389 
 
Beitz, Charles. 1983. ‘Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment’. The Journal of 
Philosophy, 80: 591-600 
 
Bell, Derek. 2006. ‘Political Liberalism and Ecological Justice’. Analyse & Kritik, 28: 
206-222 
 
Caney, Simon. 2007. Justice Beyond Borders. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Casal, Paula. 2003. ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Animals?’. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 11: 1-22 
 
Cochrane, Alasdair. 2007. ‘Animal Rights and Animal Experiments: An Interest-Based 
Approach’. Res Publica 13: 293-318 
 
Cowan, Tyler. 2003. ‘Policing Nature’. Environmental Ethics 25: 169-182 
 
Deckers, Jan. 2009. ‘Vegetarianism, Sentimental or Ethical?’. Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics, Online First 
 
Diamond, Cora. 1978. ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’. Philosophy 53: 465-479 
 
Donlan, C. Josh, et al. 2006. ‘Pleistocene Rewilding: An Optimistic Agenda for 
Twenty-First Century Conservation’. The American Naturalist, 168: 660-681 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
 
Hails, Chris, et al. eds. 2008. Living Planet Report 2008. Gland: WWF International 
 
Hatley, James. 2004. ‘The Uncanny Goodness of Being Edible to Bears’. In Rethinking 
Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, ed. V Foltz and R Frodeman. 
Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 
 
Hume, David. 1740. A Treatise of Human Nature Vol. III: Of Morals. In A Treatise of 
Human Nature, ed. L A Selby-Bigge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1888. 
Revised edition, 1978 
 





Nuffield Council of Bioethics. 2005. The Ethics of Research Involving Animals. 
London: Nuffield Council of Bioethics 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. 1990. ‘Aristotelian Social Democracy’. In Liberalism and the 
Good, ed. B Douglass, G M Mara & H S Richardson. London: Routledge 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. Women and Human Development. New York: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Paterson, Tony. 2008. ‘Knut is a Psychopath and will Never Mate, say Experts’. The 
Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/knut-is-a-psychopath-
and-will-never-mate-say-experts-772865.html. Accessed 10 September 2009 
 
Pogge, Thomas. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised 
edition 1999 
 
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Paperback edition 1996 
 
Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. Revised edition 2004 
 
Schinkel, Anders. 2008. ‘Martha Nussbaum on Animal Rights’. Ethics and the 
Environment 13: 41-69 
 
Schlosberg, David. 2007. Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements and 
Nature. New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Sen, Amartya. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Singer, Peter. 1974. ‘All Animals Are Equal’. In Applied Ethics, ed. Peter Singer. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 
 
Singer, Peter. 2003. ‘Not for Humans Only: The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental 





Thadeusz, Frank. 2007. ‘Is Berlin’s Polar Bear Baby Too Human? Knut should be 
Killed, say some Animal Activists’. Der Spiegel. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,472480,00.html. Accessed 10 
September 2009 
 
Wolff, Jonathan, and Avner de-Shalit. 2007. Disadvantage. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Obituary: John Bachar. 2009. The Economist. 
http://www.economist.com/obituary/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14029915. Accessed 10 
September 2009 
 
